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Abstract. Online platforms, such as Airbnb, hotels.com, Amazon, Uber
and Lyft, can control and optimize many aspects of product search to im-
prove the efficiency of marketplaces. Here we focus on a common model,
called the discriminatory control model, where the platform chooses to
display a subset of sellers who sell products at prices determined by the
market and a buyer is interested in buying a single product from one
of the sellers. Under the commonly-used model for single product selec-
tion by a buyer, called the multinomial logit model, and the Bertrand
game model for competition among sellers, we show the following result:
to maximize social welfare, the optimal strategy for the platform is to
display all products; however, to maximize revenue, the optimal strategy
is to only display a subset of the products whose qualities are above a
certain threshold. We extend our results to Cournot competition model,
and show that the optimal search segmentation mechanisms for both
social welfare maximization and revenue maximization also have simple
threshold structures. The threshold in each case depends on the quality
of all products, the platform’s objective and seller’s competition model,
and can be computed in linear time in the number of products.
Keywords: Online Platform Markets · Bertrand Competition Game ·
Search Segmentation.
1 Introduction
In recent years, we have witnessed the rise of many successful online platform
markets, which have reshaped the economic landscape of modern world. The
online platforms facilitate the exchange of goods and services between buyers
and sellers. For example, buyers can purchase goods from sellers on Amazon,
eBay and Etsy, arrange accommodation from hosts on Airbnb and Expedia,
order transportation services from drivers on Uber and Lyft, and find qualified
workers on online labor markets, such as Upwork and Taskrabbit. The total
market value of online platforms has exceeded 4.3 trillion dollars worldwide, and
is growing quickly [17].
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One salient feature of these online platforms are that the market operators
have fine-grained information about the underlying characteristics of transac-
tions, and can leverage this knowledge to design effective and efficient market
structure. Compared with traditional markets, the modern online marketplaces
have greater controls over price determination, search and discovery, informa-
tion revelation, recommendation, etc. For example, Uber and Lyft adopt the
full control model, in which the ride-sharing platforms use online matching algo-
rithms to determine matches between drivers and riders as well as the fee for the
route [10,12]. Amazon and Airbnb use the discriminatory control model, where
the platforms only control the list of products to display for each buyer’s search,
and the potential matches and transaction prices are determined by the pref-
erence of buyers and the competition among sellers [13,22]. The platform can
also use other types of control, such as commissions/subscriptions fees [8], to
influence the outcomes of markets. The rich control options for online platforms
have led to an increasing discussion about the design of online marketplaces with
different optimization objectives [5,6,25,30].
In this paper, we investigate social welfare and revenue optimization under
the discriminatory control model for online marketplaces. In the discriminatory
control model, the platform has only control over search segmentation mecha-
nisms - which products to display for each buyer’s search, and the transaction
prices are endogenously determined by the competition among sellers. Unlike
traditional firms, most online platforms do not manufacture goods or provide
services, and thus they also do not dictate the specific transaction prices. Instead,
buyers and sellers jointly determine the prices at which the goods or services will
be traded. For example, sellers set prices for their goods on Amazon, hosts decide
on the price for their properties on Airbnb, and freelancers negotiate employers
with hourly fee on Upwork. These prices depend on the demand and supply for
comparable goods and services in the market, and choosing different products
to display for buyers impacts the transaction prices and then the social welfare
and revenue. Motivated by this, we study the role of search segmentation mech-
anisms in social welfare and revenue optimization in the discriminatory control
model with endogenous prices.
To calculate the social welfare and revenue, we first need to specify demand
and supply in online marketplaces. Much of prior work simply represent the
demand/supply curves with non-increasing/non-decreasing distributions [6,8].
Instead, we consider a demand and supply function derived from a basic market
setting in which each seller has one unit of product to offer, and each buyer de-
mands at most one unit of product chosen from the products displayed to her3.
Given the quality and prices of products, the demand for each product is equiv-
alent to the proportion of potential buyers that purchase such a product. Thus,
the demand function is closely related to the purchase behaviors of buyers who
face multiple substitutable products. We adopt the standard multinomial logit
(MNL) model [28] to describe buyers’ choice behaviors, and then derive the de-
mand as a softmax function. With such a specific demand function, we can model
3 Throughout the article, we use product to refer good/service, and use the terms of
product and seller interchangeably.
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the competition among sellers via a Bertrand price competition game, which is a
useful model for investigating oligopolistic competition in real markets [38]. For
instance, the Bertrand game can model the situation where the hosts on Airbnb
compete for potential guests by setting prices for their properties. The basic
questions for the Bertrand competition game are existence, uniqueness, closed-
form expression and learning algorithm of the equilibrium. The results in [2,21]
have shown that there exists a unique (pure) Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand
game with a MNL model. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium coincides with the
solution of a system of first-order-condition equations. We can then characterize
the Nash equilibrium in a “closed” form, and express the equilibrium social wel-
fare/revenue by employing a variant of Lambert W function [14]. We also derive
myopic learning strategies, i.e., best response dynamics, for sellers to reach the
Nash equilibrium in practice.
The online platform can further optimize the equilibrium social welfare/revenue
by employing search segmentation mechanisms. Different sets of sellers involved
in the Bertrand competition game lead to different equilibrium solutions. The
goal of the search segmentation mechanisms is to efficiently choose a set of prod-
ucts to display for buyers (or in other words, choose a set of sellers to compete
in the Bertrand game) that maximizes the equilibrium social welfare or rev-
enue. This display control optimization problem is combinatorial in nature and
the number of possible product sets can be very large, particularly when there
are many potential products to offer. One of our main contributions is to iden-
tify the efficient and optimal search segmentation mechanism, which turns out
to have a simple structure. We show that the online platform will display all
products to maximize equilibrium social welfare, but just display the top k∗ high-
est quality products to maximize equilibrium revenue. We also refer the optimal
mechanism for revenue maximization as quality-order mechanism. The optimal
threshold k∗ depends on the quality of all products, and can be calculated in
linear time in terms of the number of products. The optimality of such simple
search segmentation mechanisms has crucial theoretical and practical implica-
tions. On the theoretical side, this result allows the platform to find the optimal
set of displayed products in linear time, significantly reducing the computational
complexity of searching for the optimal solution. On the practical side, optimal-
ity of quality-order mechanism is quite appealing as it guarantees that a lower
quality product will not be chosen for display over a higher quality product.
Moreover, in order to increase the opportunity of being selected, sellers would
improve the quality of their products as product quality is the selection criteria
of the optimal mechanism, which will benefit all the market participants in the
long term.
The optimality of the quality-order mechanism for revenue maximization is
established by making a novel connection between the quasi-convexity of equi-
librium revenue functions and the optimal control decision on selecting displayed
products. We show that in the Bertrand game with a given subset of sellers, the
equilibrium revenue can be expressed as a quasi-convex function with respective
to an independent variable, which is a one-to-one transformation of the quality of
a candidate product. The property of quasi-convexity guarantees that the max-
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imum revenue can be obtained at one of the two endpoints, which corresponds
to the options of displaying the current set of products or involving a new prod-
uct with the highest quality among the remaining products. With this critical
observation, if the platform decides to add a new product, it will always select
the available product with the highest quality. Thus, we can efficiently construct
the optimal set of displayed products from any product set. Specifically, if the
current product set does not contain all the top k∗ products, we can further
improve the equilibrium revenue by repeatedly replacing one currently selected
product with an unselected product with a higher quality.
Our work in this paper is related to work on the design of markets for net-
worked platforms [6,7,27,32]. We present a detailed discussion of related work
towards the end of the paper. Here, we briefly discuss the similarities and dif-
ferences between our work and prior work on networked market platforms. In
networked markets, there are buyers and sellers connected by a bipartite graph,
where each link indicates that a specific buyer is allowed to buy from a specific
seller. The goal is to remove links from the complete bipartite graph to maximize
either social welfare or revenue. However, much of the prior work focuses on a
linear price-demand curve which does not explicitly model situations where each
buyer is interested in buying only one product (such as one copy of a book) and
each buyer takes into account the quality of each product (available typically
in the form of reviews) while making a buying decision. For such situations,
economists use the MNL model, which we have adopted in this paper. On the
other hand, compared to prior work on networked markets, we only consider a
much simpler bipartite graph where there is only one representative buyer. Such
a model is appropriate when there are no capacity constraints for products at
a seller, for example, each seller may have many copies of a book and there is
no danger of immediately selling out a particular book title. The model is also
appropriate for hotels.com-type settings in situations when most hotels have
multiple available rooms. In situations where multiple buyers are performing
searches simultaneously and hotels are about to sell out of rooms, capacity con-
straints do matter. Such capacity-constrained situations have not been studied
either in this paper or in prior work, and is a topic for future research.
We now summarize the main contributions of this paper.
• We introduce a stylized model to capture the main features of online plat-
form markets. We explicitly model the market, where each buyer is interested
in purchasing one product, and takes into account the quality of products when
making choice. Specifically, the demand function for products is derived from
the multinomial logit (MNL) choice model, and the supply response of sellers
is described by the outcome of Bertrand competition game. We show that the
Bertrand game exists a unique (pure) Nash equilibrium, and the best response
dynamics converge to the equilibrium. We also explicitly express the social wel-
fare and revenue under the equilibrium.
• We design efficient search segmentation mechanisms to optimize equilib-
rium social welfare and revenue under the Bertrand model of competition. We
first prove that it is optimal to display all products to maximize social welfare.
For revenue maximization, we then show that the optimal mechanism, referred
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to as quality-order mechanism, only needs to display the top k∗ highest quality
products, where the optimal number of products k∗ can be found in linear time.
• We prove the result for social welfare maximization by showing the equi-
librium social welfare function is decreasing with respective to an independent
variable, which also decreases for involving a new product. We establish the op-
timality of the quality-order mechanism for revenue maximization by making
a novel connection between the quasi-convexity of equilibrium revenue function
and the optimal decision on selecting displayed products.
•We extend our results to another classical oligopolistic competition model:
Cournot competition game. We show that the optimal search segmentation
mechanisms for both social welfare and revenue maximization in this model also
falls into the simple quality-order mechanisms, in which the optimal threshold
k∗ depends on the product quality and the platform’s specific objective.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a two-sided market with n sellers S = {1, 2, · · · , n} and one rep-
resentative buyer, representing a set of homogeneous buyers. Each seller i ∈ S
offers a product with quality θi and price pi. We denote the quality and price
vectors by θ = (θ1, θ2, · · · , θn) and p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn), respectively. The qual-
ity vector θ is fixed, while the price vector p is determined by the competition
among sellers. Without loss of generality, we assume the products’ quality and
prices are non-negative, i.e., θi ≥ 0 and pi ≥ 0, and the sellers are sorted accord-
ing to the product quality in a non-decreasing order, i.e., θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θn.
Given the quality θ and prices p of all products, the buyer purchases one of the
n products, or adopts an outside option, i.e., buys nothing from this market. We
normalize the problem parameters so that outside option’s quality θ0 and price
p0 are zero, i.e., θ0 = p0 = 0.
In the random utility model [29], the buyer derives utility ui from purchasing
the product i ∈ S or selecting the outside option i = 0 as follows
ui , θi + ξi − pi,
where ξi is a random variable representing buyer’s (private) preference about
the ith alternative. Given the n+ 1 choices (n products and the outside option),
the buyer selects the alternative with the maximum utility. Under the standard
assumption that the random variables {ξi} are independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) with Gumbel distribution [4,23], it can be shown [4,28] that the
buyer selects the alternative i ∈ {0} ∪ S with probability
qi(p) , Pr(ui = max
j∈{0}∪S
uj) =
ai
1 +
∑
j∈S aj
, (1)
where ai = exp(θi − pi) for all i ∈ S. We refer to qi as demand or market share
of the alternative i ∈ {0} ∪ S. We can also interpret qi as the expected sales of
quantity of product i normalized by the total number of potential buyers. This
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choice model is known as multinomial logit (MNL) model in economic litera-
ture [4,23,28]. We use q = (q0, q1, · · · , qn) to denote the demands of products.
Under the above model, we can also obtain an explicit form for the utility u¯
of the representative buyer
u¯ , E[ max
i∈{0}∪S
ui] = log(1 +
∑
i∈S
ai).
From the demand qi(p) in (1), we can express seller i’s expected revenue ri(p)
in terms of prices
ri(p) , pi × qi(p) = pi × ai
1 +
∑
j∈S aj
. (2)
The social welfare of the two-sided market is measured by the sum of buyer’s
utility and the total revenue of sellers, i.e.,
sw(p) , u¯+
∑
i∈S
ri(p) = log(1 +
∑
j∈S
aj) +
∑
i∈S
pi × ai
1 +
∑
j∈S aj
. (3)
The revenue of the market is the total revenue of all sellers, i.e.,
re(p) ,
∑
i∈S
ri(p) =
∑
i∈S
pi × ai
1 +
∑
j∈S aj
. (4)
We now note the relation between price and demand in the MNL model, which
would be quite useful for optimization and analysis later. Using the price-demand
model in (1), we can express the price pi in terms of demands q:
pi(q) = θi + log(1−
∑
j∈S
qj)− log(qi). (5)
The social welfare and revenue optimization would become convenient if we work
with the demands q rather than the prices p. For example, the social welfare
and revenue functions are not concave in p [24], but become jointly concave if
we express the functions in terms of q [16,36]. In Appendix A, we leverage this
property to derive the optimal prices for social welfare and revenue maximization
in the full control model, where the platform can control both price and displayed
products.
3 Bertrand Competition Game
In discriminatory control model, the online platform can only control the list
of products to display for buyers, and the transaction prices are endogenously
determined by the oligopolistic competition among sellers. In a Bertrand com-
petition game, the seller of each product sets a price. Based on the prices of
the products and the set of available products, the market produces a certain
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demand for each product. In our MNL model, the demand is simply the proba-
bility with which a product will be purchased by the buyer. This is the typical
situation in a Airbnb-like model, where the owner of each rental unit sets a price,
the platform controls the manner in which the rental units are displayed, and
the renter selects a unit to rent.
In this section, we investigate the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
in the Bertrand competition game, explicitly express the equilibrium social wel-
fare/revenue, and derive the best response dynamics to reach the Nash equilib-
rium. We assume that only a subset S ⊆ S of sellers are involved in the game.
In other words, we assume that the platform has chosen to display the products
of a subset S of the sellers. In the next section, we will show how the choice of S
can be optimized by the platform to maximize either social welfare or revenue.
In the Bertrand competition game, seller i ∈ S selects price pi to maximize
her revenue ri(p) = pi × qi(p), where the demand qi(p) is determined by the
prices p of all products in (1). We can formally represent the Bertrand game as
a triplet Gb = (S, (Pi)i∈S , (ri)i∈S), where S is a set of players, Pi is the strategy
space of player i ∈ S (i.e., Pi , {pi|pi ≥ 0}), and ri(p) is the payoff of player
i ∈ S. We represent the set of strategy profiles by P = P1 × P2 × · · · × Pn.
We also denote the strategy profile p ∈ P as p = (pi,p−i), where p−i is the
strategies (or prices) of all the players except i. For such Bertrand game, we
have the following result from [21].
Theorem 1. There exists a unique (pure) Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand
game Gb = (S, (Pi)i∈S , (ri)i∈S). A vector of prices p¯ = (p¯1, p¯2, · · · , p¯n) ∈ P
satisfies ∂ri(p¯)/∂pi = 0 for all i ∈ S if and only if p¯ is a Nash equilibrium in P.
We next calculate a closed-form expression for the Nash equilibrium prices
p¯. For each seller i ∈ S, by the first-order condition ∂ri(p¯)/∂pi = 0, we have the
following relation for p¯i:
p¯i =
1 +
∑
j∈S a¯j
1 +
∑
j∈S a¯j − a¯i
=
1
1− q¯i , (6)
where a¯i , exp(θi− p¯i) and q¯i is the demand of product i at the equilibrium, i.e.,
q¯i , a¯i/(1+
∑
j∈S a¯j). From the price function in (5) and with some calculations
applied to (6), we have the following equations
q¯0 × exp(θi − 1) = q¯i × exp( q¯i
1− q¯i ), ∀i ∈ S, (7)
where q¯0 , 1−
∑
j∈S q¯j is the probability of the buyer that purchases nothing.
We introduce a function V (x) : (0,+∞) → (0, 1), such that for any x ∈ (0,∞),
V (x) is the solution v ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
v × exp( v
1− v ) = x. (8)
We can verify that V (x) is a strictly increasing and concave function over
[0,+∞). This function is similar to the Lambert function W (x) [14], which is
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the solution w satisfying w × exp(w) = x. With the function V (x) and (7), we
can obtain a closed-form expression for the demand q¯i = V (q¯0 × exp(θi − 1)).
Combing with the definition of q¯0, we can determine q¯0 by solving the following
single-variable equation∑
i∈S
V (q¯0 × exp(θi − 1)) = 1− q¯0. (9)
This equation has a unique solution because V (x) is a strictly increasing func-
tion. We also refer this equation as the equilibrium constraint. The next theo-
rem presents a closed-form expression for the Nash equilibrium solution in the
Bertrand competition game.
Theorem 2. In the Bertrand game Gb = (S, (Pi)i∈S , (ri)i∈S), the Nash equilib-
rium price p¯i and the demand q¯i for each product i ∈ S are given by
p¯i =
1
1− V (q¯0 × exp(θi − 1)) and q¯i = V (q¯0 × exp(θi − 1)),
where q¯0 is the unique solution to (9).
Substituting the equilibrium solutions into (3), we obtain the equilibrium
social welfare in the Bertrand game with the sellers S ⊆ S
sw(S) = − log (q¯0) +
∑
i∈S
q¯i
1− q¯i . (10)
By (4), we can similarly get the equilibrium revenue in the Bertrand game with
the set of sellers S ⊆ S
re(S) =
∑
i∈S
q¯i
1− q¯i . (11)
Instead of directly deriving the equilibrium strategies in one single step, in
practice, the sellers may employ some simple, natural and myopic learning al-
gorithms, such as best response [20], fictitious play [35] or no-regret learning
algorithm [19], to interact with each other and eventually reach the equilibrium.
One straightforward procedure for sellers in online platform markets to reach
the Nash equilibrium is best response dynamics. Specifically, suppose that the
current vector of price p is not a Nash equilibrium, and a seller i ∈ S deviates by
setting a new p∗i , which is the optimal price with respective to the other prices
p−i, i.e.,
p∗i = B(p−i) , arg max
p∈[0,+∞)
ri(p,p−i).
We can verify that the revenue function ri(p,p−i) is strictly quasi-concave in p,
and thus it is not easy to explicitly solve the above optimization problem. One
key observation is that the revenue function is strictly concave in the domain
of the demand, which enables us to obtain closed-form expressions for the best
response strategies, as shown in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1. The best response price p∗i with respective to a fixed price vector p−i
can be calculated as
p∗i = θi − log
(1 + ∑
j∈S\{i}
aj)×W ( exp(θi − 1)
1 +
∑
j∈S\{i} aj
)
 ,
where W (x) is the Lambert function and aj = exp(θj − pj) for all j ∈ S.
The proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix B. We further have the following result
for such best response dynamics in the Bertrand game.
Lemma 2. From an arbitrary price vector p, the best response dynamics will
converge to the Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand game in a finite number of
steps.
The basic idea to derive this result is to show the Bertrand game is an
ordinal potential game [31] with a finite value; the detailed proof of Lemma 2 is
in Appendix C.
4 Optimal Segmenting Mechanisms
In online marketplaces, the platform has control over search segmentation mech-
anisms - which set of products to display for a buyer. The platform can display
any set of products, and the competition among selected sellers then takes place
endogenously through the Bertrand game in Section 3. The goal of the platform
is to decide the optimal products S∗ ⊆ S to display, in order to maximize the
equilibrium social welfare/revenue. For n potential products in the market, there
are 2n − 1 possible sets of products, thus an exhaustive search to determine the
optimal set of displayed products is infeasible. We also note that the equilibrium
constraint (9) imposed by the Bertrand competition game is highly nonlinear,
which presents another challenge in deriving the optimal search segmentation
mechanism. In this section, we exploit the structure of social welfare/revenue
functions to efficiently derive the optimal search segmentation mechanisms.
4.1 Social Welfare Maximization
In the following theorem, we show the online platform would display all products
to maximize social welfare.
Theorem 3. For social welfare maximization, the optimal search segmentation
mechanism is to display all products S in the platform.
Proof. We prove this theorem by showing that adding a new product will always
improve the equilibrium social welfare. Suppose the platform has already selected
sellers S ⊂ S, and consider introducing a new product j ∈ S\S. According to
(10), we can express the equilibrium social welfare sw as
sw = − log q¯0 +
∑
i∈S
q¯i
1− q¯i +
xj × q¯j
1− xj × q¯j . (12)
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Here, q¯i = V (q¯0× exp(θi−1)) and xj is an indicator for product j ∈ S\S, where
xj = 1 denotes product j is selected for display; otherwise xj = 0. It is difficult
to directly compare sw with xj = 1 and the one with xj = 0. From (9), the
demands q satisfy the following equilibrium constraint:
1− q¯0 =
∑
i∈S
q¯i + xj × q¯j =
∑
i∈S
V (q¯0 exp(θi − 1)) + xj × V (q¯0 exp(θj − 1)). (13)
Since V (x) is an increasing function, we can observe from the above equation
that q¯0 decreases when xj changes from 0 to 1. Furthermore, with (12) and (13),
we can express the equilibrium social welfare as a function of q¯0:
sw(q¯0) = − log q¯0 +
∑
i∈S
q¯i
1− q¯i +
1− q¯0 −
∑
i∈S q¯i
q¯0 +
∑
i∈S q¯i
. (14)
Thus, we only need to prove that sw(q¯0) is a decreasing function. The basic idea
is to explicitly calculate the first derivative of sw(q¯0), and show sw
′(q¯0) < 0. We
present the detailed proof of the following lemma in Appendix D.
Lemma 3. The social welfare sw(q¯0) is a decreasing function.
From this lemma and the above discussion, we can always improve the equi-
librium social welfare by adding a new product, which completes the proof.
4.2 Revenue Maximization
The optimal search segmentation mechanism with the objective of revenue max-
imization is different from the optimal mechanism when the platform attempts
to maximize social welfare. To illustrate this difference, we consider two cases:
a low quality case, e.g., θ1 = θ2 = · · · = θn = 0.5, and a high quality case, e.g.,
θ1 = θ2 = · · · = θn = 10. From the result in Theorem 3, the optimal mechanisms
for social welfare maximization in these two cases are to display all products.
However, for revenue maximization, it can be verified that the platform still dis-
plays all products in the low quality case, but only selects the first product in
the high quality case. We next show the design rationale for the optimal search
segmentation mechanisms for the revenue maximization.
One critical decision the platform has to make is the following: given a set
of products S ⊂ S, whether to display the currently selected product set S,
or add a new product j from S\S. We refer to such a decision problem as the
“incremental” problem. Similar to the discussion on social welfare maximization,
given a set of selected products S ⊂ S, we can represent the equilibrium revenue
under these two decision options with the following function:
re =
∑
i∈S
q¯i
1− q¯i +
xj × q¯j
1− xj × q¯j . (15)
We recall that xj is an indicator for product j ∈ S\S, where xj = 1 indicates
that product j is selected for display; otherwise xj = 0. The demands q¯i’s satisfy
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Fig. 1. re(q¯0) is a quasi-convex revenue function for the possible product set to display
when the product 1 has been selected. re(q¯min0 ) is the revenue obtained by displaying
S∗ = {1, 2}, re(q¯middle0 ) is the revenue from showing S∗ = {1, n}, and re(q¯max0 ) is the
revenue of displaying S∗ = {1}.
the following equilibrium constraint:
1− q¯0 =
∑
i∈S
q¯i + xj × q¯j =
∑
i∈S
q¯i + xj × V (q¯0 × exp(θj − 1)). (16)
Using the above relation, we can further express the equilibrium revenue in (15)
as a function of q¯0:
re(q¯0) =
∑
i∈S
q¯i
1− q¯i +
1
q¯0 +
∑
i∈S q¯i
− 1. (17)
Since V (x) is an increasing function, we have a critical observation from (16):
given a selected product set S, the quality θj of the potential product j has a
one-to-one and inverse relation with the demand q¯0, i.e., when xj = 1, involving
the product with a higher quality θj leads to the lower value of q0. With this
observation, we can derive the feasible range of the independent value q¯0. On
the one hand, when the platform selects the available product with the highest
quality, i.e., the product j ∈ S\S with θj ≥ θj′ for all j′ ∈ S\S, the demand
q¯0 achieves its lower bound at q¯
min
0 . On the other hand, setting xj to 0 rep-
resent the case that the platform does not select any new product, and the
corresponding demand q¯max0 in this case is the upper bound of q¯0. Thus, we have
q¯0 ∈
[
q¯min0 , q¯
max
0
]
for all the decision on selecting different possible product j.
Based on the above discussion, we show that the optimal search segmentation
mechanism is to choose the k∗ products with the best quality, for an appropriate
value of k∗, using the following steps:
– First, we show that one should always display the product with the best
quality to maximize revenue (Lemma 4).
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– Then, we consider the decision of adding one product to display. As discussed
previously, we show that re(q0) is quasi-concave in q0 which implies that the
optimal decision is to add the next highest quality product or to not add a
product at all. The quasi-convexity of re(q0) is shown in Lemma 5 under a
certain condition, which is relaxed in Appendix H. Using the quasi-convexity
of re(q0), in Lemma 6, we prove that if the optimal display set consists of
k∗ products, then one should select the top k∗ products in terms of quality.
– The final step is to find the optimal k∗. This can be done by the following
calculation. For each possible value of k∗ ∈ {2, · · · , n}, we select the top
k∗ products and find the revenue. We choose k∗ to maximize this revenue.
This is clearly a linear-time algorithm in n, since one has to add one term
to the expression for the revenue when we increase k∗ by one. This result is
summarized in Theorem 4.
We first show that revenue maximization implies that the highest quality
product is always selected for display.
Lemma 4. For revenue maximization, it is optimal to always display the prod-
uct with the highest quality.
The intuition behind the proof of this lemma is to show that for any displayed
product set, the revenue function in (17) increases with the quality of the product
with the highest quality in this set. The proof is in Appendix E.
Lemma 4 implies that when the optimal search segmentation mechanism is
to display one product, i.e., k∗ = 1, the platform will choose the first prod-
uct. To obtain the result for the general case with k∗ ≥ 2, we need to es-
tablish the quasi-convexity of the revenue function in (17). It is non-trivial to
directly verify this property because the first term in the revenue function, i.e.,∑
i∈S
q¯i
1−q¯i , is increasing and concave with respective to q0, while the remaining
term 1q¯0+
∑
i∈S q¯i
− 1 is decreasing and convex. We first prove the desired quasi-
convexity and design the optimal search segmentation mechanisms by assuming
that all demands q¯i’s are less than 0.5, i.e., q1 < 0.5, due to qi ≤ q1 for all i ∈ S,
meaning that no seller dominates the market. This assumption simplifies the
analysis, but still preserves the major intuition. Our results also hold without
this assumption, as shown in Appendix H.
Lemma 5. For any selected product set S, the revenue function re(q¯0) in (17)
is quasi-convex in the range
[
q¯min0 , q¯
max
0
]
, under the assumption of q1 < 0.5.
The basic idea to prove this result is to check the second-order conditions of
a quasi-convex function, i.e., at any point with zero slope, the second derivative
is non-negative, i.e., re′(q¯0) = 0⇒ re′′(q¯0) > 0. The details are in Appendix F.
Equipped with Lemma 5, we can derive the optimal search mechanism for the
case with k∗ ≥ 2.
Lemma 6. For revenue maximization, the optimal search segmentation mech-
anism is to display the top k∗ products if the cardinality of the optimal product
set is k∗ ≥ 2, under the assumption of q1 < 0.5.
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The optimality of the top k∗ mechanism in this Lemma can be established
by showing that replacing any product with a product of higher quality will
increase the revenue (see Appendix G for the proof).
While the specific value of k∗ depends on the quality of all products θ, The
platform can find the optimal k∗ in linear time by computing the revenue of each
set with the top k ∈ [1, n] products, and selecting the one with the maximum
revenue. Thus, from Lemma 4 and Lemma 6, we obtain the main result for the
revenue maximization.
Theorem 4. For revenue maximization, the optimal search segmentation mech-
anism is to display the top k∗ products, where k∗ is determined by the quality of
all products θ, and can be calculated in linear time.
5 Extensions to Cournot Competition Game
In oligopolistic markets, another popular model to capture sellers’ competition
is Cournot game [15], in which sellers compete via controlling the supplies to
products. Specifically, each seller selects the number of units she wants to sell,
and the number of items that a seller wants to sell influences the availability of
products and thus their prices. In other words, the prices are determined by the
seller indirectly, by influencing supply. Although the Bertrand game appears to
be more appropriate to capture the sellers’ price competition in practice, such
as the Airbnb or hotels.com case, the Cournot game can also be used to model
a specific type of price competition, i.e., a two-stage quantity precommitment
price competition [18,26]. In this case, sellers compete on quantity in the first
stage, and then compete on price in the second stage with the fixed committed
quantity. Sellers on Airbnb or hotels.com type platform can first compete via the
number of units they sell, and then compete by the price per unit. It has been
shown in [18,26] that under certain conditions, the equilibrium in Cournot game
is the equilibrium of such two-stage quantity precommitment price competition
game. In this section, we discuss the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, and
then derive the optimal segmenting mechanisms for the Cournot game model.
In a Cournot competition, seller i ∈ S chooses a demand qi to maximize her
revenue ri(q) = pi(q)× qi, where the price pi(q) of the product i is determined
by the demand vector q in (5). Thus, we express the revenue of sellers in terms
of demand vector q. Similar to the Bertrand game, we can represent a Cournot
game as a triplet Gc = (S, (Qi)i∈S , (ri)i∈S), where S is a set of players, Qi is
the strategy space of player i ∈ S, and ri(q) is the payoff of player i ∈ S. We
represent the set of strategy profiles Q = Q1 × Q2 × · · · × Qn. According to
price-demand relation in (1), the requirement of non-negative prices implies the
feasible strategy space
Q =
q : 0 ≤∑
i∈S¯
qi ≤
∑
i∈S¯ exp(θi)
1 +
∑
i∈S¯ exp(θi)
,∀S¯ ⊆ S.
 ,
which is convex and compact. We also denote a feasible strategy profile q ∈ Q
as q = (qi, q−i). Using the facts that the payoff function ri(qi, q−i) is a strictly
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concave function with respective to qi and the feasible strategy profile space Q
is convex and compact, the Cournot game Gc is a concave game as defined in
Rosen’s paper [33]. From Rosen’s result [33], we know that there exists a unique
(pure) Nash equilibrium, and the Nash equilibrium can be obtained from the
system of first-order-condition equations.
Setting the partial derivative ∂ri(qi, q−i)/∂qi to be zero for all i ∈ S, we have
∂ri(qi, q−i)
∂qi
= θi − 1− qi
1−∑j∈S qj − log
(
qi
1−∑j∈S qj
)
= 0, ∀i ∈ S.
We define a variable wi , qi/(1−
∑
j∈S qj), and the above equations become
exp(θi − 1) = wi × exp(wi), ∀i ∈ S.
Thus, we get wi = W (exp(θi − 1)), where W (x) is the Lambert function. Ac-
cording to the definition of wi, we obtain the equilibrium demands
qˆi =
wi
1 +
∑
j∈S wj
=
W (exp(θi − 1))
1 +
∑n
j=1W (exp(θj − 1))
, ∀i ∈ S.
We can verify that such a demand vector qˆ satisfies the feasible constraint, i.e.,
qˆ ∈ Q. Substituting qˆ into (5), we obtain the corresponding equilibrium prices
pˆi = 1 +W (exp(θi − 1)).
We summarize the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot competition game in the
following theorem.
Theorem 5. There exists a unique (pure) Nash equilibrium in the Cournot
game Gc = (S, (Qi)i∈S , (ri)i∈S). The Nash equilibrium demand qˆi and price
pˆi for each seller i ∈ S are given by
qˆi =
W (exp(θi − 1))
1 +
∑
j∈SW (exp(θj − 1))
, pˆi = 1 +W (exp(θi − 1)).
Substituting equilibrium solutions into (3), we can get the equilibrium social
welfare in the Cournot game with the seller set S ⊆ S
ŝw(S) = log(1 +
∑
i∈S
wi) +
∑
i∈S(w
2
i + wi)
1 +
∑
i∈S wi
. (18)
Similarly, for the set of sellers S ⊆ S, the equilibrium revenue in the Cournot
game is
r̂e(S) =
∑
i∈S(w
2
i + wi)
1 +
∑
i∈S wi
. (19)
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5.1 Social Welfare Maximization
In contrast to the Bertrand game, it may be possible for the platform to achieve
higher equilibrium social welfare by just displaying a subset of products in the
Cournot game. We construct a simple instance to illustrate this difference. Sup-
pose there is only one product with high quality, and the remaining products
have low quality, e.g., θ1 = 10 and θi = 0 for all i ∈ S\{1}. By the equilib-
rium social welfare in (18), we can verify that the optimal search segmentation
mechanism in the Cournot game is just to select the first product, while the
optimal mechanism in the Bertrand game is to display all products according to
the result in Theorem 3.
Before presenting the main result, we first show an important lemma for the
Cournot game.
Lemma 7. For social welfare maximization in a Cournot game, the optimal
search segmentation mechanism is to display the top k products if the cardinality
of the optimal product set is k.
As in the case of revenue maximization in Bertrand competition, the idea to
establish this result is also to make a connection of quasi-convexity of equilibrium
social welfare/revenue functions with the decision on displaying products. The
detailed proof of this lemma is in Appendix I.
We have shown that to maximize equilibrium social welfare, the platform
may not display all products in a Cournot game. To find the optimal number
of products k∗, which depends on the product quality vector θ, the platform
can calculate equilibrium social welfare for each possible k, and select the one
with the maximum social welfare. By Lemma 7, for each candidate k, we only
need to consider the set containing the top k products. Thus, the platform can
determine the optimal k∗ in linear time, leading to the following main result.
Theorem 6. For social welfare maximization, when sellers compete via a Cournot
game, the optimal search segmentation mechanism is to display the top k∗ prod-
ucts, where k∗ is determined by the quality of all products θ, and can be calculated
in linear time.
5.2 Revenue Maximization
Similar to social welfare maximization, the platform also displays a subset of
products to maximize equilibrium revenue in a Cournot game. As before, we
first present a useful lemma.
Lemma 8. For revenue maximization in the Cournot game, the optimal search
segmentation mechanism is to display the top k products if the cardinality of the
optimal product set is k.
The key idea to prove this lemma directly follows from the proof for Lemma 7,
and we defer it to the Appendix J. With this lemma, we can derive the following
result for revenue maximization in the Cournot game.
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Theorem 7. For revenue maximization, when sellers compete via a Cournot
game, the optimal search segmentation mechanism is to involve the top k∗ prod-
ucts, where k∗ is determined by the quality of all products θ, and can be calculated
in linear time.
6 Related Work
Our work is related to the burgeoning literature that studies online platform
marketplaces of using control levels other than pricing to influence the mar-
ket outcomes [5,6,8,25]. Kanoria and Saban designed a framework to facilitate
the search for buyers and sellers on matching platforms, and found that simple
restrictions on what buyers/sellers can access would boost social welfare [25].
Arnosti et al. investigated the welfare loss due to the uncertainty about seller
availability in asynchronous dynamic matching markets, and also found that lim-
iting the visibility of sellers can improve social welfare [5]. Our result, displaying
only a subset of products to buyers can increase the equilibrium revenue, extends
the findings in these two pieces of work to the context of revenue optimization.
Banerjee et al. studied how the platform should control which sellers and buyers
are visible to each other, and provided polynomial-time approximation algo-
rithms to optimize social welfare and throughput [6]. In their model, supply
and demand are associated with public distributions. By contrast, we adopt the
MNL model to derive a specific demand system, and use the Bertrand game to
capture supply response to this demand system, doing so leads to very different
optimization problems. There are also other types of control mechanisms that
can be used to efficiently operate the online platforms, such as commission rates
and subscription fees [8] and prices and wages for buyers and sellers [3].
Revenue management under the MNL and general demand model has been
extensively studied in economics, marketing and operation management [16,34,36,37].
The model considered in this paper is closely related to that in assortment
optimization, which is an active area in revenue management research. In the
problem of assortment optimization, the demand of products are governed by
the variants of attraction-based choice models, such as MNL model [28], mixed
nested logit model [11] and nested logit model [39], and each product is as-
sociated with a fixed price. The objective is to find a set of products, or an
assortment to offer that maximizes the expected revenue. In [37], Talluri and
van Ryzin studied the assortment optimization problem under the MNL model,
and showed that the optimal assortment includes a certain number of products
with the highest prices. We also derive a similar result, but use the criteria of
quality rather than price to rank the potential products. In our setting a key
difference from this line of work is that the product prices are determined en-
dogenously by the outcome of oligopolistic competition games instead of being
given beforehand. Pricing multiple differentiated products in the context of the
MNL model is another fairly active direction in literature [16,24,36]. Different
from the assortment optimization problem, in this setting, all the products are
displayed, and the objective is to choose pries for the products to maximize
revenue. In contrast, we focus on search segmentation mechanisms with endoge-
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nous prices, where the platform only controls the set of displayed products, to
optimize the equilibrium social welfare/revenue.
Bertrand competition, proposed by Joseph Bertrand in 1883, and Cournot
competition, introduced in 1838 by Antoine Augustin Cournot, are fundamen-
tal economic models that represent sellers competing in a single market, and
have been studied comprehensively in economics. Due to the motivation that
many sellers compete in more than one market in modern dynamic and diverse
economy, a recent and growing literature has studied Cournot competitions in
network environments [1,7,27,32]. The work [1,7] focused on characterizing and
computing Nash equilibria, and investigated the impact of changes in the (bi-
partite) network structure on seller’s profit and buyer’s surplus. [27] and [32]
analyzed the efficiency loss of networked Cournot competition game via the
metric of price of anarchy. While all these previous works focused on the ob-
jective of social welfare maximization in networked Cournot competition, we
consider the objective of both social welfare and revenue maximization in the
networked Bertrand competition, and also in the networked Cournot competi-
tion. We further provide efficient segmenting mechanisms to optimize the social
welfare/revenue under the Nash equilibrium.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have studied the problems of social welfare maximization and
revenue maximization in designing search space for online platform markets.
In the discriminatory control model, the platform can only control the search
segmentation mechanisms, i.e., determine the list of products to display for buy-
ers, and the products’ prices are determined endogenously by the competition
among sellers. Under the standard buyer choice model, namely the multinomial
logit mode, we have developed efficient and optimal search segmentation mech-
anisms to maximize the equilibrium social welfare and revenue under Bertrand
competition game. For social welfare maximization, it is optimal to display all
the products. For revenue maximization, the optimal search mechanism, referred
as quality-order mechanism, is to display the top k∗ highest quality products,
where k∗ can be computed in at most linear time in the number of products.
We extend our results to Cournot competition game, and show that the optimal
search segmentation mechanisms are also the simple quality-order mechanisms,
for the objectives of both social welfare and revenue maximization.
One possible direction for future work is to extend the quality-order mecha-
nisms to more complex demand models (such as mixed MNL model and nested
logit model) and general buyer-seller (bipartite) networks. Another interesting
research topic is to design the optimal search mechanisms in dynamic setting,
where buyers arrive and depart, and sellers have limited capacity for products.
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A Monopolistic Market
In this section, we consider an online marketplace in the full control model as a
monopolistic market, where the platform (or monopoly) jointly determines the
price vector p and the set of displayed products to maximize social welfare or
revenue. We first fix the displayed products as S ⊆ S, and investigate the optimal
monopoly prices.
It turns out that social welfare function in (3) and revenue function in (4)
are not concave in prices [24]. The key observation here is that the social wel-
fare and revenue functions become jointly concave if we work with the demand
vector [16,36]. Using the price-demand relation in (5), we can express the social
welfare as a function of demand vector q:
sw(q) = −(1−
∑
j∈S
qj)× log(1−
∑
j∈S
qj) +
∑
i∈S
(θi − log(qi))× qi. (20)
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Similarly, the revenue function can be re-written as
re(q) =
∑
i∈S
(θi + log(1−
∑
j∈S
qj)− log(qi))× qi. (21)
According to (1), the requirement of non-negative prices implies that the feasible
demand space is given by
Q =
{
q : 0 ≤
∑
i∈S
qi ≤
∑
i∈S exp(θi)
1 +
∑
i∈S exp(θi)
,∀S ⊆ S.
}
, (22)
which is convex and compact. Therefore, the problem of social welfare maxi-
mization in the monopolistic market can be formulated as
max
q∈Q
sw(q) = −(1−
∑
j∈S
qj) log(1−
∑
j∈S
qj) +
∑
i∈S
(θi − log(qi))qi.
This optimization problem is a standard concave maximization problem. By
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition [9], we set partial derivative ∂sw(q)∂qi = 0,
and re-formulate this equation to get
exp(θi) =
q∗i
1−∑j∈S q∗j , ∀i ∈ S.
Solving this system of equations, we can derive the optimal market shares q∗
and the corresponding optimal prices p∗ for social welfare maximization in the
monopolistic market:
q∗i =
exp(θi)
1 +
∑
j∈S exp(θj)
, p∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ S.
In the optimal solution for social welfare maximization, the platform sets prices
of all products to be zero, and the demands are proportional to their product
quality. The revenue of the seller is zero, and the utility of the buyer is maximized.
The optimal social welfare for displaying products S ⊆ S is
sw∗(S) = log(1 +
∑
i∈S
exp(θi)). (23)
Similarly, revenue maximization in the monopolistic market is also a convex
optimization problem. can be formulated as
max
q∈Q
re(q) =
∑
i∈S
(θi + log(1−
∑
j∈S
qj)− log(qi))× qi.
By setting the partial derivative ∂re(q)∂qi = 0, we can get
θi − 1 = log( q
∗
i
1−∑j∈S q∗j ) +
∑
j∈S q
∗
j
1−∑j∈S q∗j i ∈ S.
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Using the relation between qi and pi in (1), we can express the above equations
in terms of pi’s to simplify the calculation:
exp(θi − 1) = ai × exp(
∑
j∈S
aj), i ∈ S. (24)
Solving this system of equations, we can obtain∑
j∈S
aj = W (
∑
j∈S
exp(θj − 1)), (25)
where W (x) is the Lambert function [14], and is the solution w satisfying w ×
exp(w) = x. Substituting (25) back into (24), we can calculate the optimal price
p∗ and demand q∗ for revenue maximization in the monopolistic market
p∗i = 1 + ω, q
∗
i =
exp ((θi − 1)− ω)
1 + ω
, ∀i ∈ S,
where ω ,W (
∑
j∈S exp(θj − 1)). In the optimal solution for revenue maximiza-
tion, the platform sets the same price for all products, and the demands are also
proportional to the product quality. The optimal revenue for the set of selected
sellers S ⊆ S is
re∗(S) = W (
∑
j∈S
exp(θj − 1)). (26)
From (23) and (26), we can observe that both the optimal social welfare and
revenue in the monopolistic market are increasing with respective to the number
of displayed products. Thus, in the full control model, the platform displays all
products S to buyers, and sets the optimal prices p∗ to maximize the social
welfare or revenue.
B Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. From the relation between price and demand in (5), we can write the
seller i’s revenue in (2) with respective to the demand qi:
ri(qi) = qi × (θi + log(q0)− log(qi)). (27)
Here, we have used q0 = 1−
∑
j∈S qj . The variable q0 depends on all qj ’s, which
makes it difficult to calculate the optimal demand q∗i . We next express q0 only
using qi. From (1), we have q0 × aj = qj ,∀j ∈ S. We summarize these equations
over all j ∈ S\{i}, and obtain q0 ×
∑
j∈S\{i} aj =
∑
j∈S\{i} qj . Combining with
q0 = 1−
∑
j∈S qj , we have
q0 =
1− qi
1 +
∑
j∈S\{i} aj
. (28)
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We note that given a vector of fixed prices p−i, the aj = exp(θj−pj),∀j ∈ S\{i}
are constants. Using (28), we can rewrite the revenue function ri(qi) as
ri(qi) = qi ×
θi + log( qi
1− qi )− log(1 +
∑
j∈S\{i}
aj)
 ,
and that it is strictly concave. We calculate the first derivative of ri(qi), and set
it to be zero:
r′i(qi) = θi − log(
qi
1− qi )− log(1 +
∑
j∈S\{i}
aj)− qi
1− qi − 1,
r′i(q
∗
i ) = 0⇒ (
q∗i
1− q∗i
)× exp( q
∗
i
1− q∗i
) =
exp(θi − 1)
1 +
∑
j∈S\{i} aj
,
⇒ q
∗
i
1− q∗i
= W (
exp(θi − 1)
1 +
∑
j∈S\{i} aj
), (29)
where W (x) is the Lambert function. With q0 × a∗i = q∗i and (28), we have
a∗i
1 +
∑
j∈S\{i} aj
=
q∗i
1− q∗i
Together with (29), we can get
a∗i = W (
exp(θi − 1)
1 +
∑
j∈S\{i} aj
)× (1 +
∑
j∈S\{i}
aj)
⇒ p∗i = θi − log
W ( exp(θi − 1)
1 +
∑
j∈S\{i} aj
)× (1 +
∑
j∈S\{i}
aj)
 .
We need to guarantee that the new price p∗i is non-negative. From the definition
of Lambert W function, we have W (x) ≤ x, and thus we can derive from the
above equation that p∗i ≥ 1. Since the other prices p−i remain the same and are
non-negative, the new price vector (p∗i ,p−i) is feasible.
C Proof for Lemma 2
Proof. We first show that the Bertrand game is an ordinal potential game. We
construct a potential function
G(p) =
∏
i∈S pi × ai
1 +
∑
j∈S aj
,
which satisfies the following property for every price vector p, every seller i ∈ S
and every unilateral deviation p′ by i:
ri(pi,p−i) > ri(p
′
i,p−i)⇔ G(pi,p−i) > G(p′i,p−i). (30)
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Since the revenue function ri(qi) in (27) is strictly concave, the deviating seller i’s
revenue strictly increases. By (30), the potential function also strictly increases
after each iteration of the best response dynamics. Thus, no cycles are possible.
Since the potential function has a finite value, the best response dynamics even-
tually reach the maxima of the potential function, i.e., the Nash equilibrium, in
finite steps.
D Proof for Lemma 3
Proof. By implicit differentiation of V (x) in (8), we can calculate the derivative
of V (x):
V ′(x) =
1
x×
(
1
V (x) +
1
(1−V (x))2
) .
We can then get the derivative of sw(q¯0) in (14)
sw′(q¯0) = − 1
q¯0
+
∑
i∈S
q¯′i
(1− q¯i)2 −
1 +
∑
i∈S q¯
′
i
q¯0 +
∑
i∈S q¯i
,
where q¯′i = exp(θi − 1)× V ′(q¯0 × exp(θi − 1)). Substituting the specific form of
V ′(x) into the above equation, we further have
sw′(q¯0) < − 1
q¯0
+
∑
i∈S
q¯′i
(1− q¯i)2 −
∑
i∈S
q¯′i
= − 1
q¯0
+
∑
i∈S
q¯′i ×
1− (1− q¯i)2
(1− q¯i)2
=
1
q¯0
(
−1 +
∑
i∈S
1− (1− q¯i)2
(1−q¯i)2
q¯i
+ 1
)
. (31)
The first inequality is due to 0 ≤ q¯0 +
∑
i∈S q¯i ≤ 1. When S = ∅, sw′(q¯0) is
negative. It is easy to check that sw′(q¯0) is also negative when |S| = 1. Thus,
without loss of generality, we can assume that at least two products have been
selected, i.e., |S| ≥ 2. We introduce an increasing sigmoidal function
f(q) , 1− (1− q)
2
(1−q)2
q + 1
,
which is convex in range [0, 0.5] and concave in range [0.5, 1]. We plot the graph
of f(q) in Figure 2. We also plot the graphs of linear functions f1(q) = q and
f2(q) = a× q, where the slope is a = f(1−q1)1−q1 with q1 ≥ 0.5. We summarize two
important properties of the function f(q).
• For any q ∈ [0, 1], f(q) + f(1− q) = 1.
• For any q ∈ [0, 0.5], f(q) ≤ f1(q), and f(q) ≤ f2(q) for any q ∈ [0, 1 − q1]
with q1 ≥ 0.5.
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Fig. 2. The function f(q) is sigmoidal over the interval [0, 1], and is convex in [0, 0.5]
and concave in [0.5, 1].
To prove (31) is non-positive, we consider the following optimization problem:
Maximize
∑
i∈S
f(q¯i), Subject to
∑
i∈S
q¯i = 1,
and show the optimal objecitve is always no more than 1, i.e.,
∑
i∈S f(q¯i) ≤ 1
by separately considering the following two cases:
• When |S| = 2, according to the first property of function f(q), we have∑
i∈S f(qi) = 1.
• When |S| > 2, we further consider two different scenarios. If q¯i ≤ 0.5 for
all i ∈ S, by the second property of f(q), we have∑
i∈S
f(q¯i) ≤
∑
i∈S
q¯i = 1.
In the other case, one of the q¯i’s is larger than 0.5. Since
∑
i∈S q¯i = 1 and
0 ≤ q¯i ≤ q¯1, we can claim q¯1 > 0.5 and q¯i < 1 − q¯1 for all i ∈ S\{1}. By the
second property of f(q), we have
f(q¯i) ≤ f2(q¯i) = f(1− q¯1)
1− q¯1 × q¯i, ∀i ∈ S\{1}.
Thus, we can further get
f(q¯1) +
∑
i∈S\{1}
f(q¯i) ≤ f(q¯1) + f(1− q¯1)
1− q¯1 ×
∑
i∈S\{1}
q¯i
= f(q¯1) + f(1− q¯1) = 1.
The first equality comes from
∑
i∈S q¯i = 1, and the second equality is due to the
first property of f(q).
From the above discussion, we have proved that the maximum value of∑
i∈S f(q¯i) is no more than 1. By (31), it follows that sw
′(q¯0) < 0,
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Fig. 3. The function g(q¯) has one critical property: for any pair of q¯i and q¯j with
0.5 ≥ q¯i ≥ q¯j ≥ 0, the relation −1/3 ≤ g(q¯i) ≤ g(q¯j) ≤ 1 holds.
E Proof for Lemma 4
Proof. Suppose the displayed product set S does not contain the product with
the highest quality. We denote the product with the highest quality in S as i∗,
i.e., q¯i∗ ≥ q¯i,∀i ∈ S. We only need to show that the revenue does not decrease if
we replace the product i∗ with the product 1, which is equivalent to increase the
quality of product i∗ from θi∗ to θ1. From (17), we can calculate the derivative
of the revenue function with the product set S:
re′(q¯0) =
∑
i∈S\i∗
q¯′i
(1− q¯i)2 −
1 +
∑
i∈S\i∗ q¯
′
i
(1− q¯i∗)2 . (32)
Here, we use the equilibrium constraint q¯i∗ +
∑
i∈S\i∗ q¯i = 1 − q¯0. Since q¯i∗ ≥
q¯i,∀i ∈ S\i∗, we can derive that re′(q¯0) ≤ 0, and thus re(q¯0) is a non-increasing
function. Furthermore, as the quality θi∗ has an inverse relation with the demand
q¯0 from (16), increasing θi∗ to θ1 is equivalent to decrease q¯0, which would not
decrease the revenue. From the above discussion, we can obtain the result.
F Proof for Lemma 5
Proof. The basic idea can be illustrated via the case of k∗ = 2 and S = {1}.
From (17), we have the revenue function for this case
re(q¯0) =
q¯1
1− q¯1 +
1
q¯0 + q¯1
− 1, q¯0 ∈
[
q¯min0 , q¯
max
0
]
. (33)
We check the second-order conditions of a quasi-convex function, i.e., at any
point with zero slope, the second derivative is non-negative: re′(q¯0) = 0 ⇒
re′′(q¯0) > 0. The first derivative of the revenue function is
re′(q¯0) =
q¯′1
(1− q¯1)2 −
1 + q¯′1
(q¯0 + q¯1)
2 ,
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and the corresponding second derivative is
re′′(q¯0) =
q¯′′1
(1− q¯1)2 +
2× (q¯′1)2
(1− q¯1)3 −
q¯′′1
(q¯0 + q¯1)2
+
2× (1 + q¯′1)2
(q¯0 + q¯1)3
. (34)
With the expression of q¯′i =
1
q¯0×
(
1
q¯i
+ 1
(1−q¯i)2
) , we can calculate that q¯′′i = q¯′iq¯0 ×
(−1 + g(q¯i)) , where
g(q¯i) ,
1(
1
q¯i
+ 1(1−q¯i)2
)2 × ( 1q¯2i − 2(1− q¯i)3
)
. (35)
The function g(q¯) has one critical property needed for the later analysis: g(q¯) is
a decreasing function over the range [0, 0.5], g(0) = 1 and g(0.5) = −1/3. We
can verify this property by showing the first derivative g′(q¯) is negative in the
range [0, 0.5]. We also plot the graph of g(q¯) in Figure 3. We then rewrite the
second derivative in (34) as
re′′(q¯0) =
(
q¯′1
(1− q¯1)2 −
q¯′1
(q¯0 + q¯1)2
)
× 1
q¯0
× (−1 + g(q¯1))
+
2× (q¯′1)2
(1− q¯1)3 +
2× (1 + q¯′1)2
(q¯0 + q¯1)3
. (36)
Since re′(q¯0) = 0, we have
q¯′1
(1− q¯1)2 =
1 + q¯′1
(q¯0 + q¯1)2
.
Combine with the fact that −1 + g(q¯1) ≤ 0, we can further relax the second
derivative in (36):
(36) ≥ 1 + q¯
′
1
(q¯0 + q¯1)2
× 1
q¯0
× (−1 + g(q¯1))
+
1
(q¯0 + q¯1)2
× 1
q¯0
× (q¯′1 × (1− g(q¯1)))
+
2× (q¯′1)2
(1− q¯1)3 +
2× (1 + q¯′1)2
(q¯0 + q¯1)3
=
1 + q¯′1
(q¯0 + q¯1)3
×
[(
1 +
q¯1
q¯0
)
× (−1 + g(q¯1))
+
q¯0 + q¯1
(1 + q¯′1)× q¯0
(q¯′1 × (1− g(q¯1)))
+
2× (q¯0 + q¯1)3
(1 + q¯′1)× q¯0
×
(
(q¯′1)
2 × q¯0
(1− q¯1)3
)
+ 2× (1 + q¯′1)
]
. (37)
We next show the following three inequalities for later analysis
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• q¯0+q¯1(1+q¯′1)×q¯0 ≥ 1,• (−1 + g(q¯1)) + 2 ≥ 0,
• (q¯0 + q¯1) ≥ 0.5.
The first two inequalities are easy to verify. For the last inequality, we first
have (q¯0 + q¯1) ≥ q¯1. From the definition of q¯min0 , the equality (q¯0 + q¯1) = 1− q¯1
holds when q¯0 = q¯
min
0 . For any q¯0 ∈
[
q¯min0 , q¯
max
0
]
, we further have (q¯0 + q¯1) ≥
1− q¯1 because q¯1 = V (q¯0× exp(θ1−1)) is an increasing function with respective
to q¯0. Combining these two inequalities, we have (q¯0 + q¯1) ≥ max{q¯1, 1 − q¯1},
resulting in that (q¯0 + q¯1) ≥ 0.5. With these three inequalities, we can further
relax (37):
(37) ≥ 1 + q¯
′
1
(q¯0 + q¯1)3
×
[
q¯1
q¯0
× (−1 + g(q¯1)) + q¯′1 × (1− g(q¯1))
+
1
2
× q¯
′
1
(1− q¯1)3 ×
1
1
q¯1
+ 1(1−q¯1)2
+ 2× q¯′1
]
=
1 + q¯′1
(q¯0 + q¯1)3
× h(q¯1),
where we define function h(q¯1) to be
h(q¯1) ,
q¯1
q¯0
(−1 + g(q¯1)) + q¯′1 × (1− g(q¯1)) +
1
2
q¯′1
(1− q¯1)3
1
1
q¯1
+ 1(1−q¯1)2
+ 2q¯′1.
We further simplify this function as
h(q¯1) =
q¯′1
(1− q¯1)2 ×
[ (
(1− q¯1)2 + q¯1
)× (−1 + g(q¯1))
+(3− g(q¯1))× (1− q¯1)2 + 1
2
× 11
q¯1
+ 1(1−q¯1) − 1
]
.
To prove re′′(q¯0) > 0, we only need to show that h(q¯i) > 0. Since q¯1 < 0.5,
we have g(q¯1) > −1/3 from Figure 3, under which we can check h(q¯1) > 0
for all 0 ≤ q¯1 < 0.5 by plotting the figure of h(q¯1). Thus, we have proved the
quasi-convexity of the revenue function re(q¯0) when q¯1 < 0.5.
G Proof for Lemma 6
Proof. The basic idea behind the proof can be illustrated via the case of k∗ = 2.
From Lemma 4, we know the first product would always be involved. Thus, the
remaining part is to prove it is optimal to select the second product. The revenue
when the platform displays the first product and another product is
re(q¯0) =
q¯1
1− q¯1 +
1
q¯0 + q¯1
− 1, q¯0 ∈
[
q¯min0 , q¯
max
0
]
. (38)
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We recall that re(q¯min0 ) denotes the revenue of selecting the first two prod-
ucts, and re(q¯max0 ) represents the revenue of only selecting the first product.
From Lemma 5, we know that the revenue function re(q¯0) is quasi-convex over
the interval
[
q¯min0 , q¯
max
0
]
, which implies
re(q¯0) ≤ max
{
re(q¯min0 ), re(q¯
max
0 )
}
, ∀q¯0 ∈
[
q¯min0 , q¯
max
0
]
.
re(q¯max0 ) cannot be the maximum value of re(q¯0), because otherwise the size of
the optimal product set is 1, which contradicts the assumption in this lemma.
We then have re(q¯0) ≤ re(q¯min0 ), meaning that the platform always selects the
first two products when k∗ = 2. The analysis for the case of k∗ > 2 follows the
same principle. Thus, we have completed the proof to this lemma.
H Results for q¯1 ≥ 0.5 in Bertrand Competition Game
When there is one seller that dominates the market, i.e., q¯1 ≥ 0.5, in the revenue
maximization, we need more complicated analysis to establish the optimality of
the top k∗ search segmentation mechanism. We have proved the result for the
case of k∗ = 1 in Lemma 4. We now further consider the special cases of k∗ = 2
and k∗ ≥ 3 without any restriction of q1, respectively.
Theorem 8. For revenue maximization, the optimal search segmentation mech-
anism is to display the first two products if the cardinality of the optimal product
set is two, i.e., k∗ = 2.
Proof. The basic idea is the same as that in the proof of Lemma 6, showing
the quasi-convexity of the revenue function re(q¯0). Without the assumption of
q¯1 < 0.5, we need some new techniques to establish this result.
Lemma 9. The revenue function re(q¯0) is quasi-convex over the range [q¯
min
0 , q¯
max
0 ].
Proof. We first calculate the derivative of re(q¯0) in (40),
re′(q¯0) =
q¯′1
(1− q¯1)2 −
1 + q¯′1
(q¯0 + q¯1)2
.
Using the equation that q¯′1 =
1
q¯0×
(
1
q¯1
+ 1
(1−q¯1)2
) , we further have
re′(q¯0) = A×
(
(q¯0 + 2)× q¯21 + (q¯20 + q¯0 − 1)× q¯1 − q¯0
)
, (39)
where A = 1((1−q¯1)2+q¯1) × 1q¯0 × 1(q¯1+q¯0)2 and is positive. We evaluate the values
of re′(q¯0) at two end points q¯min0 and q¯
max
0 , respectively. If q¯0 is equal to q¯
min
0 ,
representing the platform displays the first two products, then the demands
satisfy the relation: 2× q¯1 = 1− q¯min0 . With this equation, we can derive
re′(q¯min0 ) = A×
(−3× q¯min0 − (q¯min0 )3) < 0.
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Fig. 4. The possible intersections of functions q¯1(q¯0) and V (q¯0 × exp(θ1 − 1)) with
different quality parameter θ1.
Similarly, when q¯0 is equal to q¯
max
0 , we have q¯1 = 1− q¯max0 and
re′(q¯max0 ) = A× (1− 2× q¯max0 ) .
Based on the definition of V (x) in (8), we have the following relation
(1− q¯max0 )× exp
(
1− q¯max0
q¯max0
)
= q¯max0 × exp(θ1 − 1)
⇒ 1− q¯
max
0
q¯max0
= W (exp(θ1 − 1)). (40)
For such scenario, we further consider two different cases:
• Case A: for the first case with θ1 ≤ 2, according to the equation in (40),
we have q¯max0 ≥ 1/2, and thus re′(q¯max0 ) ≤ 0.
• Case B: for the other case with θ1 > 2, we have q¯max0 < 1/2, and thus
re′(q¯max0 ) > 0.
We next show the number of roots for the equation re′(q¯0) = 0 in the above
two cases, respectively. The main trick here is to regard q¯0 as a fixed value, and
express q¯1 as a function of q¯0 by setting re
′(q¯0) = 0 in (39). Based on this idea,
we have
q¯1(q¯0) =
− (q¯20 + q¯0 − 1)+√q¯40 + 2× q¯30 + 3× q¯20 + 6× q¯0 + 1
2× (q¯0 + 2) .
We recall that q¯1 can also be expressed as V (q¯0× exp(θ1−1)). The intersections
of these two functions represent the roots for the equation re′(q¯0) = 0. We plot
these two functions in Figure 4.
In Case A discussed before, i.e., θ ≤ 2, we can observe from the figure that the
functions q¯1(q¯0) and V (q¯0× exp(θ1−1)) have at most one intersection, implying
re′(q¯0) = 0 has at most one root. This is because when θ ≤ 2, the intersection of
these two functions can only occur in the range q¯0 ∈ [0.5, 1]. We further have that
q¯1(q¯0) decreases, while V (q¯0× exp(θ1− 1)) increases in this interval q¯0 ∈ [0.5, 1].
30 Z. Zheng and R. Srikant
Together with the results that re′(q¯min0 ) < 0 and re
′(q¯max0 ) ≤ 0 in Case A,
we can derive that the root of re′(q¯0) = 0 cannot be located in [q¯min0 , q¯
max
0 ] and
then re′(q¯0) ≤ 0 for q¯0 ∈ [q¯min0 , q¯max0 ]. This means that re(q¯0) is a non-increasing
function and thus is quasi-convex in such case.
For Case B, i.e., θ > 2, we can observe from Figure 4 that q¯1(q¯0) and V (q¯0×
exp(θ1 − 1)) have at most two intersections, and thus the equation re′(q¯0) = 0
could have one or two roots. In Case B, we have re′(q¯min0 ) < 0 and re
′(q¯max0 ) >
0, and thus only one root q¯∗0 can locate [q¯
min
0 , q¯
max
0 ]. This implies that re(q¯0)
decreases in [q¯min0 , q¯
∗
0 ] and increases in [q¯
∗
0 , q¯
max
0 ]. Thus, re(q¯0) is also quasi-
convex in Case B.
From the above discussion, we can conclude that revenue function re(q¯0) is
quasi-convex over the interval
[
q¯min0 , q¯
max
0
]
.
Following the principle of the proof in Lemma 6, we can derive the result of
this Theorem.
The next theorem extends the previous result to the scenario when the car-
dinality of the optimal product set is larger than 2.
Theorem 9. For revenue maximization, the platform will always display the
top k∗ products if the optimal search segmentation mechanism is to select k∗ ≥ 3
products.
Proof. The basic idea behind the proof can be illustrated via the case of k∗ = 3.
Without loss of generality, we can further assume that we have already selected
the product set S with the first two products 1 and 2. We only need to prove it
is optimal to involve the third highest quality product. The revenue function in
this case is
re(q¯0) =
q¯1
1− q¯1 +
q¯2
1− q¯2 +
1
q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2
− 1.
We continue the proof by considering the following two cases: q¯1 < 0.5 and
q¯1 ≥ 0.5, respectively.
• Case A: in the first case, we require q¯1 < 0.5, which implies all the demands
q¯i’s are less than 0.5. The basic idea is again to show the quasi-convexity of the
revenue function re(q¯0) over the interval
[
q¯min0 , q¯
max
0
]
, which is quite similar to
the proof in Lemma 5. For completeness, we also present the detailed proof for
the case of k∗ = 3 here.
Lemma 10. For the case of k∗ = 3, the revenue function re(q¯0) is quasi-convex
over the interval
[
q¯min0 , q¯
max
0
]
when q¯1 < 0.5.
Proof. We check the second-order conditions of a quasi-convex function, i.e., at
any point with zero slope, the second derivative is non-negative: re′(q¯0) = 0 ⇒
re′′(q¯0) > 0. The first derivative of the revenue function is
re′(q¯0) =
q¯′1
(1− q¯1)2 +
q¯′2
(1− q¯2)2 −
1 + q¯′1 + q¯
′
2
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)
2 ,
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and the corresponding second derivative is
re′′(q¯0) =
q¯′′1
(1− q¯1)2 +
2× (q¯′1)2
(1− q¯1)3 +
q¯′′2
(1− q¯2)2 +
2× (q¯′2)2
(1− q¯2)3
− q¯
′′
1 + q¯
′′
2
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)2
+
2× (1 + q¯′1 + q¯′2)2
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)3
. (41)
With the expression of q¯′i =
1
q¯0×
(
1
q¯i
+ 1
(1−q¯i)2
) , we can calculate that q¯′′i = q¯′iq¯0 ×
(−1 + g(q¯i)) , where
g(q¯i) ,
1(
1
q¯i
+ 1(1−q¯i)2
)2 × ( 1q¯2i − 2(1− q¯i)3
)
. (42)
We then rewrite the second derivative in (41) as
re′′(q¯0) =
(
q¯′1
(1− q¯1)2 −
q¯′1
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)2
)
× 1
q¯0
× (−1 + g(q¯1))
+
(
q¯′2
(1− q¯2)2 −
q¯′2
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)2
)
× 1
q¯0
× (−1 + g(q¯2))
+
2× (q¯′1)2
(1− q¯1)3 +
2× (q¯′2)2
(1− q¯2)3 +
2× (1 + q¯′1 + q¯′2)2
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)3
. (43)
Since re′(q¯0) = 0, we have
q¯′1
(1− q¯1)2 +
q¯′2
(1− q¯2)2 =
1 + q¯′1 + q¯
′
2
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)2
.
Combining with the fact that −1 + g(q¯1) ≤ −1 + g(q¯2) ≤ 0, we can further relax
the second derivative in (43):
(43) ≥ 1 + q¯
′
1 + q¯
′
2
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)2
× 1
q¯0
× (−1 + g(q¯1))
+
1
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)2
1
q¯0
(
q¯′1 × (1− g(q¯1)) + q¯′2 × (1− g(q¯2)
)
+
2× (q¯′1)2
(1− q¯1)3 +
2× (q¯′2)2
(1− q¯2)3 +
2× (1 + q¯′1 + q¯′2)2
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)3
=
1 + q¯′1 + q¯
′
2
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)3
×
[(
1 +
q¯1
q¯0
+
q¯2
q¯0
)
× (−1 + g(q¯1))
+
q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2
(1 + q¯′1 + q¯
′
2)× q¯0
(
q¯′1 × (1− g(q¯1)) + q¯′2 × (1− g(q¯2))
)
+
2× (q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)3
(1 + q¯′1 + q¯
′
2)× q¯0
×
(
(q¯′1)
2 × q¯0
(1− q¯1)3 +
(q¯′2)
2 × q¯0
(1− q¯2)3
)
+2× (1 + q¯′1 + q¯′2)
]
. (44)
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We next show the following three inequalities for later analysis
• q¯0+q¯1+q¯2(1+q¯′1+q¯′2)×q¯0 ≥ 1,
• (−1 + g(q¯1)) + 2 ≥ 0,
• (q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2) ≥ 0.5.
The first two inequalities are easy to verify. For the last inequality, we first
have (q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2) ≥ q¯1. From the definition of q¯min0 , the equality (q¯0 + q¯1 +
q¯2) = 1 − q¯1 holds when q¯0 = q¯min0 . For any q¯0 ∈
[
q¯min0 , q¯
max
0
]
, we further have
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2) ≥ 1− q¯1 because q¯i = V (q¯0× exp(θi− 1)) is an increasing function
with respective to q¯0. Combining these two inequalities, we have (q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2) ≥
max{q¯1, 1−q¯1}, resulting in that (q¯0+q¯1+q¯2) ≥ 0.5. With these three inequalities,
we can further relax (44):
(44) ≥ 1 + q¯
′
1 + q¯
′
2
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)3
×
[(
q¯1
q¯0
+
q¯2
q¯0
)
× (−1 + g(q¯1))
+q¯′1 × (1− g(q¯1)) + q¯′2 × (1− g(q¯2))
+
1
2
(
q¯′1
(1− q¯1)3
1
1
q¯1
+ 1(1−q¯1)2
+
q¯′2
(1− q¯2)3
1
1
q¯2
+ 1(1−q¯2)2
)
+2× (q¯′1 + q¯′2)
]
=
1 + q¯′1 + q¯
′
2
(q¯0 + q¯1 + q¯2)3
× (h(q¯1) + h(q¯2)),
where we define function h(q¯i), i ∈ S to be
h(q¯i) ,
q¯i
q¯0
(−1 + g(q¯1)) + q¯′i × (1− g(q¯i)) +
1
2
q¯′i
(1− q¯i)3
1
1
q¯i
+ 1(1−q¯i)2
+ 2q¯′i.
We further simplify this function as
h(q¯i) =
q¯′i
(1− q¯i)2 ×
[ (
(1− q¯i)2 + q¯i
)× (−1 + g(q¯1))
+(3− g(q¯i))× (1− q¯i)2 + 1
2
× 11
q¯i
+ 1(1−q¯i) − 1
]
.
To prove re′′(q¯0) > 0, we only need to show that h(q¯i) > 0. Since q¯1 < 0.5 in
this case, we have g(q¯1) > −1/3, leading to that
h(q¯i) > q¯
′
i × (1− q¯i)2 × h¯(q¯i),
where
h¯(q¯i) , −4
3
(
(1− q¯i)2 + q¯i
)
+ (3− g(q¯i))× (1− q¯i)2 + 1
2
1
1
q¯i
+ 1(1−q¯i) − 1
. (45)
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Fig. 5. The graph of function h¯(q¯i), which shows that h¯(q¯i) ≥ 0 for all q¯i ≤ 0.5.
It is tedious but one can verify h¯(q¯i) > 0 for all 0 ≤ q¯i < 0.5, and a graph of
this function is shown in Figure 5. Thus, we have proved the quasi-convexity of
revenue function re(q¯0) when q¯1 < 0.5.
• Case B: in the second case, q¯1 is larger or equal to 0.5. We show that the
optimal mechanism would still select the third product in this case. Let q¯∗0 be
the q¯0 that makes q¯1 = 0.5. According to the definition of q¯
min
0 , when q¯0 = q¯
min
0 ,
we have q¯1 < 0.5, and thus we can get q¯
min
0 < q¯
∗
0 . This threshold q¯
∗
0 separates
the range [q¯min0 , q¯
max
0 ] into two intervals: [q¯
min
0 , q¯
∗
0 ] and [q¯
∗
0 , q¯
max
0 ].
We next show that it is not necessary to consider the interval [q¯∗0 , q¯
max
0 ] under
the assumption of k∗ = 3. We prove this by showing that the revenue generated
when q¯0 ∈ [q¯∗0 , q¯max0 ] is always less than the revenue of only selecting the first
product, leading to a contradiction to k∗ = 3. Since q¯1 = V (q¯0 × exp(θ1 − 1)) is
an increasing function with respective to q¯0, we have q¯1 ≥ 0.5 for q¯0 ∈ [q¯∗0 , q¯max0 ].
The candidate product j ∈ S\S satisfies equation q¯1 + q¯2 + q¯j = 1 − q¯0 with
the requirements of q¯1 ≥ 0.5 and q¯0 ∈ [q¯∗0 , q¯max0 ]. The revenue of selecting these
three products is
rea(q¯0) =
q¯1
1− q¯1 +
q¯2
1− q¯2 +
q¯j
1− q¯j .
For each such new product j, we construct a virtual product j′ with the quality
parameter θ′j that satisfies q¯j′ = V (q¯0×exp(θj′−1)) = q¯2+q¯j and q¯1+q¯j′ = 1−q¯0.
The revenue of selecting the first product 1 and the virtual product j′ is
reb(q¯0) =
q¯1
1− q¯1 +
q¯j′
1− q¯j′ =
q¯1
1− q¯1 +
1
q¯0 + q¯1
− 1.
We have shown in Lemma 5 that such revenue function reb(q¯0) is quasi-convex
over the range
[
q¯min
′
0 , q¯
max′
0
]
4, which implies that reb(q¯0) is also quasi-convex
4 We note that
[
q¯min
′
0 , q¯
max′
0
]
is different from
[
q¯min0 , q¯
max
0
]
. When q¯0 = q¯
max′
0 , we
only select the first product, and in the case of q¯0 = q¯
max
0 , we select the first two
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over [q¯∗0 , q¯
max′
0 ]. Thus, we have
reb(q¯0) ≤ max
{
reb(q¯
∗
0), reb(q¯
max′
0 )
}
, ∀q¯0 ∈ [q¯∗0 , q¯max
′
0 ].
We next show that reb(q¯
max′
0 ) ≥ reb(q¯∗0). We first specifically write down the
revenue at these two end-points, respectively. When q¯0 = q¯
max′
0 , meaning the
platform only selects the first product, and we have V (q¯max
′
0 × exp(θi − 1)) =
q¯1 = 1 − q¯max′0 . Similar to (40), we can also have 1−q¯
max′
0
q¯max
′
0
= W (exp(θ1 − 1)),
where W (x) is the Lambert function. The revenue for the case of q¯0 = q¯
max′
0 is
reb(q¯
max′
0 ) =
q¯1
1− q¯1 =
1− q¯max′0
q¯max
′
0
= W (exp(θ1 − 1)).
When q¯0 = q¯
∗
0 , we select the virtual product j
′ such that q¯1 = 0.5. Thus, we
have V (q¯∗0 × exp(θ1 − 1)) = 0.5, and by the definition of function V (x), we can
further derive q¯∗0 = 0.5× exp(2− θ1). The revenue for the case of q¯0 = q¯∗0 is
reb(q¯
∗
0) =
q¯1
1− q¯1 +
1
q¯∗0 + q¯1
− 1 = 2
2× q¯∗0 + 1
=
2
exp(2− θ1) + 1 .
To prove reb(q¯
max
0 ) ≥ reb(q¯∗0), we only need to show that
W (exp(θ1 − 1)) ≥ 2
exp(2− θ1) + 1 , ∀θ1 ≥ 0.
We introduce an auxiliary notation x , exp(θ1 − 1), and express the above
inequality as
W (x) ≥ 2× x
e+ x
, ∀x ≥ exp(−1),
where e is Euler’s number. As W (x) ≥ 2 > 2×xe+x for x ≥ 2×exp(2), the remaining
part is just to show that
W (x) ≥ 2× x
e+ x
, ∀x ∈ [exp(−1), 2× exp(2)].
The above inequality can be verified by more tedious calculations, and a plot of
W (x) and 2×xe+x over the range x ∈ [exp(−1), 2×exp(2)] is shown in Figure 6. From
the above discussion, we can derive that for any q¯0 ∈ [q¯∗0 , q¯max0 ], the following
relation holds
reb(q¯
max′
0 ) ≥ reb(q¯0) =
q¯1
1− q¯1 +
q¯2 + q¯j
1− (q¯2 + q¯j)
≥ q¯1
1− q¯1 +
q¯2
1− q¯2 +
q¯j
1− q¯j = rea(q¯0).
This means that when q¯0 ∈ [q¯∗0 , q¯max0 ], the revenue of displaying three prod-
ucts rea(q¯0) is always less than the revenue of only displaying the first product
reb(q¯
max′
0 ), which contradicts the assumption of k
∗ = 3. Thus, we can conclude
that q¯0 /∈ [q¯∗0 , q¯max0 ].
products. Thus, we have q¯1 = 1 − q¯max′0 and q¯1 + q¯2 = 1 − q¯max0 , resulting in that
q¯max
′
0 ≥ q¯max0 . With the definition of q¯min
′
0 , we still have q¯
min′
0 < q¯
∗
0 .
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Fig. 6. The graph of functions W (x) and 2×x
e+x
, which shows that W (x) ≥ 2×x
e+x
for all
exp(−1) ≤ x ≤ 2× exp(2).
We next consider the other interval q¯0 ∈ [q¯min0 , q¯∗0 ], and show that it is still
optimal to display the third product given the selected product set S = {1, 2}.
In this case, the market share q¯1 is less than 0.5. Thus, we can use the result
in Lemma 10 to conclude that the revenue function re(q¯0) is quasi-convex over
[q¯min0 , q¯
∗
0 ], and have
re(q¯0) ≤ max
{
re(q¯min0 ), re(q¯
∗
0)
}
, ∀q¯0 ∈
[
q¯min0 , q¯
∗
0
]
.
Similarly, re(q¯∗0) cannot be the maximum value of re(q¯0) for q¯0 ∈
[
q¯min0 , q¯
∗
0
]
,
because otherwise the cardinality of the optimal product set would be 1 due to
the previous discussion. We then have re(q¯0) ≤ re(q¯min0 ) for q¯0 ∈
[
q¯min0 , q¯
∗
0
]
,
meaning that it is optimal to select the third product in this case.
From the above discussion for Case A and Case B, we have proved that the
optimal search segmentation mechanism is to select the first three products when
k∗ = 3.
From Theorem 8 and Theorem 9, we have shown that the top-k search seg-
mentation mechanism is still optimal when qi’s can be arbitrage values.
I Proof for Lemma 7
Proof. In the case of k∗ = 1, we can verify from (18) that the equilibrium social
welfare increases with the quality of the selected product. Thus, the optimal
mechanism is to display the first product when k = 1. We assume k ≥ 2 for
the following discussion. We recall that products are sorted in a non-decreasing
order in terms of quality. As the Lambert function is an increasing function
over [0,+∞), we further have w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥ wn > 0, where we recall
wi = W (exp(θi − 1)). Suppose the optimal search segmentation mechanism
selects the set of products S ⊆ S with |S| = k, which does not contain all the
first k products. We will show that we can replace this product set S with the set
Sˆ = {1, 2, · · · , k}, and also improve equilibrium social welfare. Consider product
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j ∈ S\S, that achieves the maximum wt’s among the unselected products, i.e.,
wj = arg max{wt|t ∈ S\S}. As the selected set S does not contains all the first
k products, there must exist one selected product i ∈ S such that wi < wj5.
We now show that we can replace product j with product i to improve social
welfare. Motivated by the equilibrium social welfare ŝw in (18), we introduce a
function
g(w) , log(1 +
∑
t∈S\{i}
wt + w) +
∑
t∈S\{i}(w
2
t + wt) + (w
2 + w)
1 +
∑
t∈S\{i} wt + w
. (46)
We note that the equilibrium social welfare of selecting product set S is g(wi),
the equilibrium social welfare of selecting product set S\{i}∪{j} (i.e., replacing
product i with product j) is g(wj), and g(0) denotes the social welfare of selecting
k − 1 products S\{i}.
The key idea to prove this lemma is to show that g(w) is quasi-convex over
the interval [0, wj ], which implies that
g(w) ≤ max {g(0), g(wj)} , ∀w ∈ [0, wj ].
Assuming the quasi-convexity of g(w), we claim g(0) cannot be the maximum
value of g(w) under the assumption that the optimal search segmentation mecha-
nism is to involve k products. Suppose g(0) ≥ g(w) for all w ∈ [0, wj ]. This means
that the set S\{i} with cardinality k− 1 achieves higher social welfare than the
set S with cardinality k, which contradicts the assumption in this lemma. Thus,
the maximum g(w) over the interval [0, wj ] is g(wj) and g(wj) ≥ g(wi), meaning
that selecting product j instead of product i achieves higher social welfare.
We now prove the quasi-convexity of the function g(w). We first calculate
the derivative of g(w)
g′(w) =
w2 +B × w + C
(1 +
∑
t∈S\{i} wt + w)2
,
where B = (2
∑
t∈S\{i} wt + 3) and C = −
∑
t∈S\{i}
(
w2t − wt
)
+ 2. B is always
positive, while C could be positive, negative or zero. We continue the proof by
considering the following two cases.
• If C ≥ 0 then g′(w) is positive for any non-negative w, meaning g(w) is an
increasing function, and then is a quasi-convex function over the range [0, wj ].
• If C < 0 then the equation g′(w) = 0 has a positive root w∗ = (−B +√
B2 − 4C)/2. We claim that g′(w) cannot be negative for all w ∈ [0, wj ], oth-
erwise g(0) would be the maximum value for all g(w), which contradicts the
assumption of the lemma due to the same reasons discussed before. Thus, we
can have that g′(w) is negative over the range [0, w∗) and positive in [w∗, wj ],
i.e., g(w) decreases in [0, w∗) and increases in [w∗, wj ]. With this property, it
follows that g(w) is also quasi-convex in this case.
5 For the case that wi = wj and j < i, we can directly exchange the product i and
product j, and obtain the same equilibrium social welfare.
Optimal Search Segmentation Mechanisms for Online Platform Markets 37
From the above discussion, we have proved that if the optimal mechanism is
to display k products, g(wj) is always larger than g(wi). This means that for any
selected product set S that does not contain the first k products, we can always
find an unselected product j ∈ S\S and a selected product i ∈ S with wj > wi,
and improve social welfare by replacing product j with product i. Iteratively
conducting this operation, we can obtain a new set Sˆ that exactly contains the
first k products, and achieve the maximum equilibrium social welfare when the
number of the optimal products is k.
J Proof for Lemma 8
Proof. The basic idea is also to check the quasi-convexity of the equilibrium
revenue function. The only difference is to change g(w) in (46) to gˆ(w) based on
the equilibrium revenue in (19), i.e.,
gˆ(w) ,
∑
t∈S\{i}(w
2
t + wt) + (w
2 + w)
1 +
∑
t∈S\{i} wt + w
. (47)
The corresponding derivative of gˆ(w) is
gˆ′(w) =
w2 + Bˆ × w + Cˆ
(1 +
∑
t∈S\{i} wt + w)2
,
where Bˆ = 2 ×
(∑
t∈S\{i} wt + 1
)
and Cˆ = 1 −∑t∈S\{i} w2t . Here Bˆ is always
positive, while Cˆ could be positive, negative or zero. The following steps are
similar to those in the proof for Lemma 7, and we omit them here.
